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ABSTRACT  
Many psychological models have been developed to explain the development and 
maintenance of depression. The most widely evaluated model is the cognitive model 
of depression, and it is against this model that emerging models should be compared. 
Accordingly, this cross-sectional study examined whether metacognitive beliefs, as 
specified in the metacognitive model of depression, would explain additional 
variance in depressive symptoms over dysfunctional attitudes; the core feature of the 
cognitive model. Moreover, mediational relationships between metacognitive beliefs, 
rumination, and depressive symptoms, predicted by the metacognitive model were 
also explored, whilst controlling for dysfunctional attitudes. A sample of 715 
students completed self-report questionnaires measuring depressive symptoms, 
rumination, dysfunctional attitudes, and metacognitive beliefs. Regression analyses 
showed that metacognitive beliefs made a significant statistical contribution to 
depressive symptoms, after controlling for age, gender, rumination and dysfunctional 
attitudes. Furthermore, as predicted by the metacognitive model, the relationship 
between positive metacognitive beliefs and depressive symptoms was fully mediated 
by rumination, whilst the relationship between negative metacognitive beliefs about 
uncontrollability and danger and depressive symptoms was partially mediated by 
rumination. The results provide further empirical support for the metacognitive 
model of depression and indicate that positive and negative metacognitive beliefs 
play an integral role in the maintenance of depressive symptoms.  
 
Keywords: Depression, rumination, dysfunctional attitudes, metacognitive beliefs, 
cross-sectional, mediation 
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INTRODUCTION  
Depression is a debilitating mental health disorder characterized by 
prolonged and recurrent periods of low mood that pervades nearly all aspects of an 
individual’s life (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). There are many adverse 
consequences of depression, including impaired social and interpersonal functioning 
(Petty, Sachs-Ericsson, & Joiner, 2004), reduced physical activity (Allgöwer, 
Wardle, & Steptoe, 2001), and substantial economic and healthcare costs 
(Greenberg, Fournier, Sisitsky, Pike, & Kessler, 2015; Mrazek, Hornberger, Altar, & 
Detigar, 2014).  
Given the serious consequences and concomitants of depression, it is 
essential that theoretical models, which attempt to elucidate the psychological 
mechanisms involved in depression, continue to be developed and tested. In 
comparison to pragmatic approaches, advances in theory are more likely to lead to 
more efficacious interventions (Albarracin, Gillette, Earl, Durantini, & Moon-Ho, 
2005). A rigorous test of an emerging theory would involve evaluating whether 
predictions made by the theory continue to be supported by empirical data after 
controlling for the influence of core constructs from a competing theory. In this 
paper, the aim was to conduct a stringent test of an emerging theory, the 
metacognitive model of depression (Wells, 2009), whilst controlling for the 
influence of the most widely supported psychological theory of depression, namely 
Beck’s cognitive model (Beck, 1967, 1976; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). The 
cognitive model states that people vulnerable to depression have depressogenic 
schemas that are dormant until activated by stressful life events; this is often referred 
to as the “cognitive vulnerability hypothesis”. Schemas are hypothesized to consist 
of dysfunctional attitudes, which reflect the negative beliefs an individual has about 
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themselves, the world and the future (e.g. “I am a failure”, “I must be a useful, 
productive, creative person or life has no purpose”). Maladaptive schemas give rise 
to negative automatic thoughts and bias information processing, whereby negative 
information is preferentially encoded in order to fit with pre-existing schema content. 
Therapy based on the cognitive model specifies that modifying dysfunctional 
attitudes is key to the successful treatment of depression. Although, there is 
considerable support for the cognitive model (see reviews by Beck & Dozois, 2011; 
Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2009; Clark & Beck, 2010), there are other 
psychological models that do not view dysfunctional attitudes as central to either the 
development or the maintenance of depression.  
 The metacognitive model of depression (Wells, 2009), derived from a 
broader transdiagnostic theory of psychopathology; the Self-Regulatory Executive 
Function Model (S-REF; Wells & Matthews, 1994, 1996), specifies that the 
identification and modification of dysfunctional attitudes is not required to 
successfully alleviate depression. Instead, the metacognitive model specifies that 
beliefs in the cognitive domain, such as dysfunctional attitudes, cannot explain the 
persistence or development of depression. A person may hold the dysfunctional 
attitude “I’m a failure” but the mere occurrence of the thought will not lead to 
depression, rather it is how an individual responds to the thought that determines 
psychological disorder. In the metacognitive model of depression, biased 
metacognitions will lead to the selection of a specific way to thinking and 
responding to negative thoughts and/or feelings termed the Cognitive Attentional 
Syndrome (CAS). The CAS consists of worry and rumination, heightened self-
focused attention, monitoring for signs of potential threat, and counterproductive 
coping strategies.  
Page 5 of 30 
 
Two domains of metacognitive beliefs are of particular importance in the 
model: (i) positive metacognitive beliefs concerning the usefulness of rumination 
(e.g. “I need to ruminate about my problems to find the causes of my depression”), 
and (ii) negative metacognitive beliefs concerning the uncontrollability and harm of 
rumination (e.g. “I cannot stop myself from ruminating”, “Ruminating about my 
depression could make me lose control of my mind”) and negative metacognitive 
beliefs about the interpersonal and social consequences of rumination (e.g. “People 
will reject me if I ruminate”). Negative beliefs regarding uncontrollability and harm 
are considered most salient in the development and maintenance of psychological 
disorders as “they transform cognition from a potential asset to a subjective hazard 
giving rise to a sense of acute danger, hopelessness and inefficacy” (Wells, 2013, 
p.189).  
Considerable evidence supports metacognitive model of depression.   
Papageorgiou and Wells (2001a) found all participants diagnosed with recurrent 
major depressive disorder (MDD), held both positive and negative metacognitive 
beliefs about rumination. Both positive and negative metacognitive beliefs were 
positively correlated with time spent ruminating and severity of depressive 
symptoms in clinical (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003) and non-clinical samples 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001b, 2003). Structural equation modelling has found a 
good statistical fit for the metacognitive model of depression in a depressed sample 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003) and in non-depressed samples (Papageorgiou & 
Wells, 2003; Roelofs et al., 2007).   
Several longitudinal studies have explored the relationship between 
metacognitive beliefs and depression. Weber and Exner (2013) demonstrated that 
positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination predicted severity of rumination and 
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depressive symptoms over a two month period. Papageorgiou and Wells (2009) 
found that levels of conviction in negative metacognitive beliefs about the 
uncontrollability and danger of rumination predicted depressive status (i.e. depressed 
or non-depressed) three months later, when baseline levels of depression and 
rumination were controlled. A similar study found that negative metacognitive 
beliefs about uncontrollability and harm predicted depressive symptoms six months 
later, when initial levels of depression and the influence of stressful life events were 
controlled (Yilmaz, Gençöz, & Wells, 2011). 
In terms of direct evaluations of the contribution of cognitive and 
metacognitive beliefs to depression, only one study has so far been conducted. In a 
cross-sectional cohort study using an analogue sample by Yilmaz, Gençöz, and 
Wells (2015), metacognitive beliefs about rumination made a statistically greater 
statistical contribution to depression than dysfunctional attitudes, when controlling 
for anxiety symptoms. The current study aimed to extend the Yilmaz and colleagues 
study by controlling for the potential overlap between rumination and beliefs about 
rumination. Cross-sectional studies face the potential problem of inflated correlations 
between measured variables due to common method variance (e.g. Lindell & 
Whitney, 2001). The Positive Beliefs about Rumination Scale (PBRS; Papageorgiou 
& Wells, 2001b) and the Negative Beliefs about Rumination Scale (NBRS; 
Papageorgiou, Wells, & Meina, in prep) refer explicitly to rumination, so it is 
possible that they also index the frequency of rumination rather than only measuring 
metacognitive beliefs about rumination. The present study also used a different 
measure of depression to facilitate cross-validation with the Yilmaz, Gençöz, and 
Wells (2015) study.  Specifically, the Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology 
(IDS-SR; Rush, Gullion, Basco, Jarret, & Trivedi, 1996) rather than the Beck 
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Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) was used in the 
present study. The IDS-SR was designed to measure frequency of depressive 
symptoms, rather than intensity of depressive symptoms as measured by the BDS.  
The first hypothesis is that metacognitive beliefs will explain additional variance in 
depressive symptoms, over and above that explained by dysfunctional attitudes, 
rumination and demographic variables. 
Our second aim is to examine the relationships between metacognitive 
beliefs, rumination, and depressive symptoms as predicted by the metacognitive 
model of depression. The model states that the relationship between positive 
metacognitive beliefs and depressive symptoms will be fully mediated by 
rumination, whereas the relationship between negative metacognitive beliefs –   
negative metacognitive beliefs about the uncontrollability and harm of rumination 
and negative metacognitive beliefs about the interpersonal and social consequences 
of rumination – and depressive symptoms will be partially mediated by rumination. 
In testing these predicted mediational relationships, we control for the influence of 
potential confounding variables, specifically dysfunctional attitudes, age, gender and 
the other metacognitive beliefs not being directly tested.  
 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE 
Seven hundred and fifteen students (460 women, 255 men) completed a set 
of self-report questionnaires online (a further 303 participants started the study but 
did complete the study). Participants were informed that they would be entered into 
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prize draw (first prize of £50, two second prizes of £25) if they completed all the 
questionnaires. Participant ages ranged from 17 to 51, with a mean of 21.3 years (SD 
= 4.1). Five hundred and eleven (72%) participants identified themselves as White 
British/Irish or other, 115 (16%) as Chinese, 40 (6%) as Asian sub-continent (Indian, 
Pakistani, other), 18 (2%) as mixed-race, 6 (1%) as Black British/African or other, 
and 11 (2%) choose to not to respond. The composition of the sample reflects the 
ethnic distribution of students attending the University, but includes a higher 
proportion of Chinese participants relative to the ethnic distribution in the UK. 
 
MEASURES 
Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology-Self-Report (IDS-SR; Rush, 
Gullion, Basco, Jarrett, & Trivedi, 1996).This 30-item measure assesses the severity 
of depressive symptoms of MDD as defined by the fourth edition Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). Wording of items reflects the DSM-IV focus on the frequency 
rather than intensity of symptoms. Each item consists of four statements about a 
depressive symptom. Statements are arranged in ascending order of severity using a 
4-point rating scale. Respondents are required to indicate which statement best 
describes their experience over the past week. Scores can range from 0 to 84, with 
higher scores indicating greater depressive symptoms. There is good support for its 
validity and use (Rush et al., 2006; Rush et al., 1996; Rush et al., 2005). Internal 
consistency of the IDS-SR, using Cronbach’s alpha, in this study was excellent (α = 
0.92). 
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Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).The 
RRS is 22-item measure that assesses individuals’ tendency to ruminate in response 
to depressed mood (e.g. “Think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything”). 
Statements are arranged in ascending order of severity using a 4-point rating scale, 
from “Almost never” to “Almost always”. Respondents are required to indicate 
which statement best describes what they do (and not what they think they should 
do) in response to feeling sad, down or depressed. Scores can range from 22 to 88 
with higher scores indicating a greater tendency to ruminate. The RRS is a reliable 
and valid measure of rumination (Luminet, 2004). Internal consistency in this study 
was excellent (α = 0.93). 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978).This is a 40-
item measure that assesses the intensity of dysfunctional attitudes related to 
depression (e.g. “If I do not do well all the time, people will not respect me”). 
Respondents are asked to indicate their level of agreement with statements relating to 
how they think most of the time. Statements are scored on a 7-point scale from 1 
(“Disagree totally”) to 7 (“Agree totally”). Scores range from 40 to 280 with higher 
scores indicative of more dysfunctional attitudes. The DAS has good reliability and 
validity (Cane, Olinger, Gotlib, & Kuiper, 1986).  Internal consistency of the DAS in 
this study was good (α = 0.89). 
Positive Beliefs about Rumination Scale (PBRS; Papageorgiou & Wells, 
2001b). The PBRS is a 9-item measure that assesses positive beliefs about 
rumination (e.g. “In order to understand my feelings of depression I need to ruminate 
about my problems”). Items are scored on a 4-point scale from 1 (“Do not agree”) to 
4 (“Agree very much”). Total scores range from 9 to 36 with higher scores indicating 
greater conviction in positives beliefs about rumination. The PBRS has good support 
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for its reliability and validity (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001b; Roelofs, Huibers, 
Peeters, Arntz, van Os, 2010). Internal consistency of the PBRS in this study was 
excellent (α = 0.92). 
Negative Beliefs about Rumination Scale (Papageorgiou, Wells, & Meina, in 
prep). The NBRS is a 13-item measure assessing negative beliefs about rumination. 
There are two subscales: the first (NBRS1) contains eight items that measure 
metacognitive beliefs about the uncontrollability (e.g. “Ruminating about my 
problems is uncontrollable”) and harm (e.g. “Ruminating can make me harm 
myself”) of ruminating, while the second subscale (NBRS2) contains five items that 
measure beliefs about the social and interpersonal consequences of ruminating (e.g. 
“Ruminating will turn me into a failure”). Items are scored on a 4-point scale from 1 
(“Do not agree”) to 4 (“Agree very much”). Total scores for NBRS1 and NBRS2 can 
range from 8 to 32 and 5 to 20 respectively, with higher scores indicating greater 
conviction in negative metacognitive beliefs about rumination. Support for the 
construct validity of the scale has been reported (Roelofs et al., 2010). Internal 
consistency in this study was good for both the NBRS1 (α = 0.84) and the NBRS2 (α 
= 0.85). 
 
OVERVIEW OF DATA ANALYSIS 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were used to examine the intercorrelations 
between depressive symptoms, rumination, dysfunctional attitudes and positive 
metacognitive beliefs, negative metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability and 
harm of rumination, and negative metacognitive beliefs about the interpersonal and 
social consequences of rumination. T-tests explored if there were gender differences 
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between any of the study variables. As skewness was evident in some of the scale 
distributions, we also performed non-parametric versions of the above tests and 
compared these to the parametric results, reporting any deviations.  
To test the first prediction that metacognitive beliefs would explain additional 
variance in depressive symptoms, as measured by the IDS-SR, after controlling for 
demographic variables, rumination and dysfunctional attitudes (cognitive beliefs), a 
hierarchical multiple linear regression was conducted. Predictor variables were 
entered in the following order: Step 1; age and gender, Step 2; rumination (RRS), 
Step 3; dysfunctional attitudes (DAS), and Step 4; metacognitive beliefs (PBRS, 
NBRS1, and NBRS2). Steps 3 and 4 were then reversed to test if dysfunctional 
attitudes explained additional variance in depressive symptoms after controlling for 
metacognitive beliefs. Bootstrapping techniques were used to ensure findings were 
robust. 
To test the hypothesized relationships between metacognitive beliefs (PBRS, 
NBRS1, & NBRS2), rumination, and depressive symptoms, we conducted three 
mediation analyses. In all mediational analyses, we controlled for age, gender, 
dysfunctional attitudes and the metacognitive beliefs not directly tested e.g. when 
testing whether rumination fully mediates the relationship between PBRS and the 
IDS-SR, we controlled for NBRS1 and NBRS2. A custom dialog was installed using 
the Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro to conduct the mediational analyses. We report 
bootstrapped bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) estimates and 95% confidence 
intervals for the indirect effect. BCa estimates adjust for potential bias and skew in 
the bootstrap distribution to produce more reliable parameter estimation. Here, we 
use 5,000 bootstrap samples based upon Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) 
recommendation. All data analyses were conducted with SPSS version 22.0.0.1. 




DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES 
The means, standard deviations and Pearson’s correlations between 
depressive symptoms, dysfunctional attitudes, metacognitive beliefs, and rumination 
scores are presented in Table 1. There were significant positive correlations between 
the six variables, ranging from 0.10 to 0.66.  It is noteworthy that the metacognitive 
beliefs and the dysfunctional attitudes were significantly correlated with rumination 
which highlights the importance of controlling for rumination when examining the 
specific contribution made by dysfunctional attitudes and metacognitive beliefs in 
predicting depressive symptoms. Only one gender difference was observed in scores 
on the study measures, with males scored significantly higher (M = 7.16, SD = 3.15) 
than females (M = 6.52, SD = 2.53) on the negative metacognitive beliefs about the 
personal and social consequences of rumination subscale (NBRS2; t = 2.93, p = 
.003). Age did not significantly correlate with any of the study variables. Given the 
tendency toward non-normality in some of the study variables, these analyses were 
re-run using the equivalent non-parametric tests; no differences in the pattern of 
results emerged.  
 
ASSOCIATION OF METACOGNITIVE BELIES AND DEPRESSIVE 
SYMPTOMS 
Results of the regression analyses are shown in Table 2. There was no 
evidence of multicollinearity; variance inflation factors were all less than 3 and all 
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correlations between study variables were less than .7. Autocorrelation was not a 
problem, as indicated by a Durbin-Watson test statistic of 2.06. After controlling for 
age and gender, rumination explained an additional 44% of variance in depressive 
symptoms on step 2. Dysfunctional attitudes explained a further 5% of variance in 
step 3, and on the final step (Step 4) metacognitive beliefs explained a further 5% of 
the variance in depressive symptoms.  
When the order of steps 3 and 4 were reversed, metacognitive beliefs 
explained an additional 8% of variance at step 3 (R
2
change = .08, Fchange [3, 708] = 
37.59, p < .001) and dysfunctional attitudes explained an additional 2% of the 
variance at Step 4 (R
2
change = .02, Fchange [1, 707] = 36.79, p < .001). The final model 
accounted for 54% of the variance and both dysfunctional attitudes (DAS) and 
negative metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability and harm (NBRS1) made 
significant individual contributions, whereas positive metacognitive beliefs about 
rumination (PBRS) and negative metacognitive beliefs about the interpersonal and 
social consequences of rumination (NBRS2) were not significant predictors of 
depressive symptoms. As a post-hoc test, we examined the relative contribution of 
the two independent belief domains (NBRS1, DAS) to the final model. The NBRS1 
made a significantly larger contribution than the DAS, indicated by a test of equality 
of regression coefficients (F(1,713) = 155.16, p < .001). Regression diagnostics 
revealed five extreme multivariate outliers so the regression analysis was re-run with 
extreme outliers removed; no differences in the pattern of results were observed.  
 
MEDIATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN METACOGNITIVE 
BELIEFS AND DEPRESSION BY RUMINATION  
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Results of the mediation analyses are shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3. For 
positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination, full mediation occurred, i.e. a 
significant indirect effect (ab = .19, BCa 95% CIs = .13-.25) mediated by 
rumination, on depressive symptoms, but no direct effect, whilst controlling for age, 
gender, dysfunctional attitudes, and both sets of negative metacognitive beliefs 
(NBRS1 and NBRS2).   
For negative metacognitive beliefs about the uncontrollability and harm of 
rumination (NBRS1) there was a significant indirect effect (ab = .44, BCa 95% CIs = 
.35-.55), mediated by rumination, on depressive symptoms, but the direct effect 
remained significant indicating partial mediation. We controlled for age, gender, 
dysfunctional attitudes, positive beliefs about rumination, and negative beliefs about 
rumination concerning the social and interpersonal consequences. Finally, no 
mediational relationship was found between negative beliefs about the interpersonal 
and social consequences of rumination (NBRS2) and depressive symptoms, via 
rumination.  
    
DISCUSSION 
This study provides further support for the metacognitive model of 
depression and demonstrated that metacognitive beliefs explained additional 
variance in depressive symptoms after controlling for demographic variables, 
rumination and dysfunctional attitudes. In the mediational analyses, the hypothesized 
relationships between metacognitive beliefs, rumination, and depressive symptoms 
were largely supported. Specifically, the relationship between positive beliefs about 
rumination and depressive symptoms was fully mediated by rumination, while the 
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relationship between negative beliefs about uncontrollability and harm and 
depressive symptoms was partially mediated by rumination. However, no mediation 
was found between negative metacognitive beliefs about the interpersonal and social 
consequences of rumination.  
The results from the hierarchical linear regression cross-validate those 
obtained by Yilmaz, Gençöz, and Wells (2015), such that the block of metacognitive 
beliefs was able explain additional variance in depressive symptoms after controlling 
for dysfunctional attitudes. However, in this study we examined the individual 
contributions of both domains of negative metacognitive beliefs (negative beliefs 
about uncontrollability and harm, negative beliefs about the interpersonal and social 
consequences of rumination) that feature in the metacognitive model of depression, 
whereas Yilmaz, Gençöz, and Wells, (2015) entered the negative metacognitive 
beliefs as a unitary construct. Our analysis revealed that only negative beliefs about 
the uncontrollability and harm made a significant contribution to the final model. As 
negative beliefs about interpersonal and social consequences of rumination was not a 
predictor of depressive symptoms and there was no mediational relationship between 
these beliefs and depressive symptoms via rumination, this suggests that targeting 
these beliefs in therapy may not be necessary, or that these beliefs may only be 
relevant for a subsample of patients with depression. 
Although the associations in this study appear relatively robust, there are 
several limitations to this study. Firstly, because the study was cross-sectional, 
causality cannot be assumed. The use of a student sample is a second limitation, as 
the results may not generalize to a clinical sample. Finally, though we controlled for 
rumination, we did not control for potential comorbid anxiety within the sample. 
Statistically controlling for variance associated with both anxiety and rumination 
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would permit an even more stringent test of the explanatory power of both 
dysfunctional attitudes and metacognitive beliefs.  
 Overall, the results here provide further support for metacognitive model of 
depression and suggest that modifying positive and negative metacognitive beliefs – 
and not beliefs in the cognitive domain – may be the most be important targets when 
treating depression. Vanderhasselt and Raedt (2012), for example, found results that 
have also supported this contention. They found the relationship between rumination 
and dysfunctional attitudes was fully mediated by depressive symptoms and 
suggested that clinical interventions need to reduce rumination, coupled with 
modification of dysfunctional attitudes. Moreover, several studies have demonstrated 
that clinically meaningful improvements in depressive symptoms is possible by just 
targeting rumination and maladaptive metacognitive beliefs, indicating modification 
of dysfunctional attitudes may not be necessary for successful treatment outcomes 
(Wells, Fisher, Myers, Wheatley, Patel, & Brewin, 2009; Wells, Fisher, Myers, 
Wheatley, Patel, & Brewin, 2012; Dammen, Papageorgiou, & Wells, 2015).  
Prospective and experimental studies are now required to test whether beliefs 
in the cognitive or metacognitive domains are more important in the development of 
depression. For example, observational studies using a prospective design could 
examine which belief domains at Time 1 later predict depressive symptoms at Time 
2, whilst the influence of metacognitive beliefs and dysfunctional attitudes could also 
be investigated as mechanisms of change within the context of a randomized 
controlled trial comparing metacognitive therapy against schema-based therapies.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s r correlations between study 
variables. 
 





 .24*** .61*** .49*** 19.76 12.82 
2. RRS - .48
***
 .39*** .61*** .45*** 47.08 13.13 
3. DAS  - .25*** .42*** .53*** 137.00 27.45 
4. PBRS   - .20*** .10** 20.81 6.82 
5. NBRS1    - .65*** 14.37 5.31 
6. NBRS2     - 6.75 2.78 
 
Note.  
IDS-SR = Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology – Self-Report; RRS = 
Rumination Response Scale; DAS = Dysfunctional Attitude Scale; PBRS = Positive 
Beliefs about Rumination Scale; NBRS1 = Negative Beliefs about Rumination Scale 
– Uncontrollability and Harm Subscale; NBRS2 = Negative Beliefs about 
Rumination Scale – Interpersonal and Social Consequences Subscale. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Table 2. Statistics for each step of the regression, predicting depressive symptoms (IDS-
SR). 
Variable ΔR2 ΔF p b 95% BCa CIs β p 
Step 1  .00 1.07 .344     
 Constant    16.83 11.48, 22.01  < .001 
 Age    0.10 -0.13, 0.34 .03 .397 
 Gender    1.24 -0.77, 3.12 .05 .218 
Step 2  .44 557.18 < .001     
 Constant    -14.04 -18.09, -9.69  < .001 
 Age    0.15 -0.03, 0.32 .05 .101 
 Gender    0.37 -1.12, 1.85 .01 .623 
 RRS    0.65 0.59, 0.70 .66 < .001 
Step 3  .05 70.23 < .001     
 Constant    -24.84 -29.70, -19.46  < .001 
 Age    0.14 -0.03, 0.31 .04 .098 
 Gender    0.66 -0.79, 2.10 .03 .357 
 RRS    0.53 0.47, 0.59 .54 < .001 
 DAS    0.12 0.09, 0.15 .26 < .001 
Step 4  .05 25.88 < .001     
 Constant    -24.50 -29.30, -19.46  < .001 
 Age    0.15 -0.06, 0.31 .05 .060 
 Gender    1.07 -0.29, 2.45 .04 .122 
 RRS    0.39 0.32, 0.46 .40 < .001 
 DAS    0.09 0.06, 0.12 .19 < .001 
 PBRS    -0.04 -0.14, 0.07 -.02 .443 
 NBRS1    0.62 0.40, 0.83 .26 < .001 
 NBRS2    0.23 -0.17, 0.65 .05 .171 
 
Multiple R = .74, p < .001; Adjusted R
2
 = .54 
 
Note.  
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IDS-SR = Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology – Self-Report; RRS = Rumination 
Response Scale; DAS = Dysfunctional Attitude Scale; PBRS = Positive Beliefs about 
Rumination Scale; NBRS1 = Negative Beliefs about Rumination Scale – Uncontrollability 
and Harm Subscale; NBRS2 = Negative Beliefs about Rumination Scale – Interpersonal and 
Social Consequences Subscale. 
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b = -.04, ns (b = .14**) 
Page 29 of 30 
 
Fig. 2. Mediation of negative metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability and harm of 
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b = .62*** (b = 1.06***) 
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Fig. 3. Mediation of negative metacognitive beliefs about the interpersonal and social 









Analyses controlled for: age, gender, DAS, PBRS, and NBRS1. 
 
Notes for Fig. 1, Fig. 2, and Fig. 3. 
N = 715 (5,000 bootstraps) 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, ns = non-significant 
IDS-SR = Inventory of Depressive Symptomology – Self-Report; RRS = Rumination 
Response Scale; PBRS = Positive Beliefs about Rumination; NBRS1 = Negative Beliefs 
about Rumination Scale – Uncontrollability and Harm Subscale; NBRS2 = Negative Beliefs 
about Rumination Scale – Interpersonal and Social Consequences Subscale; DAS = 
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale. 
 RRS 
  IDS-SR NBRS2 




b = .19, ns (b = .19, ns) 
